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I
Anz transport, because of certain interrelated legal, economic, and
political fundamentals, is itself essentially international, and must be
so considered in any realistic plan for world organization. The con-
flicts between national and international interests inherent in these
fundamentals, as shown below, have not been resolved.
LEGAL
Every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air-
space above its territory. It has, therefore, full right to exclude or
admit such foreign aircraft as it may determine, and to that extent
can unilaterally control international air trade routes.
EcoNO-mc
Every State, by such exclusion or admission into its territory of
foreign aircraft engaged in international commerce, directly affects
world trade and the economic position of itself and of others.
POLITICAL
Every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, has the moral right
to develop its air transport to the extent needed by its domestic and
foreign commerce and other legitimate objectives. However, world
organization may well require sufficient international control so
that air transport does not become an instrument of unfair nation-
alistic competition or aggression and, thus, the source of serious in-
ternational misunderstanding and dangerous ill-feeling.
II
These three fundamentals are closely related. It is impossible to
give sound consideration to the economic and political questions of
international air transport without a clear understanding of what is
included in the legal concept of "sovereignty over the airspace."
From this concept spring most of the practical problems of air trans-
port as an element of international relations.
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Prior to World War I, no agreement existed either between jurists
or between statesmen as to the extent of national sovereignty in the
airspace. Between 1901 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914 the
question was actively discussed. Various theories were brought forward.
These included: complete sovereignty through the whole airspace over
national territory, with resulting political control of flight in national
airspace; no sovereignty, with consequent complete freedom of flight;
differing zone systems, generally with the upper airspace free and a
lower stratum next the earth's surface under national control; variants
of these. Questions of national security, rather than economic prob-
lems, were the basis of most of these early discussions.'
An ambitious international conference held in Paris in 1910, after
careful diplomatic preparation, adjourned without reaching any deci-
sion on the primary problem-to what extent should international air
navigation be free of political control by the State flown over.2
With the outbreak of World War I, military considerations imme-
diately forced general acceptance of the sovereignty of each nation
over its airspace. Air boundaries, as well as land boundaries, were
promptly closed for security reasons. Belligerent aircraft flying over
neutral territory were forced to land and their crews interned exactly
as if surface boundaries had been crossed.'
At the close of World War I, the Aeronautical Commission of the
Peace Conference was directed to prepare an air navigation convention.
The purpose of this convention was to provide, for the first time, inter-
national rules to govern air navigation in time of peace. The United
States took an active part in the preparation of this Convention but
did not ratify it. The Convention was accepted by.the other Allied
and Associated Powers, and was adhered to by many neutrals. As
the now celebrated "Air Navigation Convention of 1919," usually
called the Paris Convention, it became the basis for much of the
modern international law of the air.4
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Article I states:
"The High Contracting Parties recognize that every power has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its ter-
ritory. For the purpose of the present Convention the territory of a
State shall be understood as including the national territory, both
that of the mother country and of the colonies, and the territorial
waters adjacent thereto." 5
With the passage of the Air Commerce -Act of 1926,1 later amplified
by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,7 the United States definitely
asserted, by federal statute, its sovereignty in the dirspace over its
territory. A similar position was taken by treaty. In the Pan Ameri-
can Convention on Commercial Aviation, signed at Havana in 1928
by the United States and various American republics, and later ratified
by the United States and others, it is provided in Article I that:
"The high contracting parties recognize that every state has com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory
and territorial waters." 8
Flowing from national sovereignty of the airspace, each State has
complete control, for political purposes, of the airspace over its terri-
tory and territorial waters. In practice it has been universally ad-
mitted since 'World War I that the aircraft of one State can enter the
airspace over the territory and territorial waters of another State, in
time of peace, only when authorized. This authorization may be by
multilateral convention among several States concerned, by bilateral
convention between two States only, or by permit issued by one State
to a particular airline or a particular aircraft of another State. In
every case, however, the authority to operate into the national air-
space, or to land, either for'refueling or to discharge or pick up cargo,
must be granted by direct license of the State concerned.
The Paris Convention, in Article 2, provided that each contracting
State should undertake in time of peace to accord "freedom of inno-
cent passage" above its territory to the aircraft of other contracting
States. In Article 15 it also provided that every aircraft of a contract-
VENTION INTERNATIONALE DU 13 OCTOBRE 1919 (1930). Dr. Roper, now Secretary-General
of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, tool: part in draft-
ing the Paris Convention. See also COLEGROVE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 53-65; TonBs,
INTEMNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN EuRoPrAN AIR TrANSEOrT (1936) 42.
5. International Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Octo-
ber 13, 1919, reproduced from Official Bulletin No. 26, Dep't of State Publication 2143
(1944); COLEGROVE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 149.
6. 44 STAT. 568 (1926), § 6, 49 U.S.C. § 176 (1939).
7. 52 STAT. 973 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §§ 401-682 (1938).
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ing State should have the right to cross the airspace of another State
without landing, following the route fixed by the State flown over,
with an additional proviso that the State flown over might require the
aircraft to land for security reasons.
To that extent the Paris Convention provided by multilateral agree-
ment among its member States for certain transit privileges. These
privileges were, however, of no importance to international air trans-
port as they applied only to private and other occasional flights. The
last clause of Article 15, as finally amended and clarified, limited the
rights of air transport, stating:
"Every contracting State may make conditional on its prior author-
ization the establishment of international airways and the creation
and operation of regular international air navigation lines, with or
without landing, on its territory." 9
This provision gave to each State flown over unilateral power to deter-
mine whether world air trade routes might cross its territory with or
without landing.
The Havana Convention of 1928 also contained provisions for the
innocent passage of aircraft of member States. This was again of no
particular importance in solving the transit problem. Few world routes
were involved, as the only ratifying States, in addition to the United
States, were Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and certain of the
Central and South American States. Also, the rights of innocent pas-
sage, so far as scheduled air transport operations are concerned, have
been construed as if the Convention contained a requirement for
special license for such operations. 0
As a result of the rights of route control flowing from the doctrine of
sovereignty of the airspace, many bilateral agreements for the estab-
lishment of air trade routes were entered into before World War II,
and franchises and licenses were issued directly to international air
line operators." Certain States, however, did not hesitate to withhold
or severely limit the issuance of transit privileges. Neither Turkey nor
China granted such permits to foreign air transport. The United
States maintained exclusive control of trans-Pacific aviation. It
granted no permits for scheduled foreign flights through Alaska,
9. TomBs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 60; Roper, Recent Developments in Internationat
Aeronautical Law (1930) 1 J. AIR L. 395; SLOTEMAKER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 37, 105;
4 HACKWORTH, DIGEST INT. LAW, 359-362; INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO.
THE REGULATION OF AERIAL NAviGATiON, OCTOBER 13, 1919, Dep't of State Publication
2143 (1944).
10. 4 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 366; 1 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 600;
Latchford, The Right of Innocent Passage in International Civil Air Navigations Agreements,
11 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. (1944) 19.
11. To~MS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 100-121; LIssITzYN, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANS-
PORT AND NATIONAL POLICY (1942) 373-402.
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Hawaii, Midway, Wake, or Guam, nor through the Philippines during
the period of its political control. Security reasons undoubtedly entered
into some, if not all, of these decisions.
Across the North Atlantic were two practical air routes. One of
these was controlled by Great Britain through its sovereignty over
Newfoundland, an almost necessary stopping-place when safe range
of aircraft was considered. The other route was via British-controlled
Bermuda and via the Portuguese-controlled Azores to Lisbon. Portu-
gal had authorized the use of the Azores for one British and one Ameri-
can operating company, but required that Lisbon be the first and last
port of call in Europe when the Azores were used in trans-Atlantic
service. Great Britain had permitted only American operations
through Newfoundland and Bermuda (in addition to its ovm proposed
operation), and such American operations were limited by the permit
to two round trips per week. The United States reciprocally granted
to a British company a permit for two trans-Atlantic weekly landings
in United States territory. Other examples could be cited.
The International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago in 1944
again considered the entire question. Present were members of the
United Nations (except Russia) and certain neutrals. The Conference
adopted a new Convention on International Civil Aviation which, it is
hoped, will soon come into force in substitution for both the Paris and
the Havana Conventions. In Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, it is
again asserted that:
"The contracting States recognize that every State has complete
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."
Territory, as defined in this Convention, includes territorial waters,
following the earlier precedents. 2
On many points the Chicago Conference failed to agree. But no one
challenged the doctrine of sovereignty of the airspace. It may cer-
tainly now be accepted as the primary rule of the international law of
the air, and must be so considered by any world organization. Any
change in this doctrine can come into effect only if the States concerned
agree to surrender part of their recognized sovereignty.
The Chicago Convention, in Article 5, gives certain limited rights
of transit to the aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air
services and to that extent is a multilateral transit agreement. The
12. Internaional Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, 1944, Final Act and .Rtaltd
Documents, DEP'T OF STATE CONFERENCE SEF. 64 (1945) 59; Convention transmitted by
President Roosevelt to U. S. Senate, Message from the President of the United State-
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 79th Cong., Ist Sess., Senate, F-xecutive A,
March 12, 1945; Convention favorably reported by Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S.
Senate, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., SEN. ExEc. REP. No. 8, June 19, 1946; ratification by U. S.
Senate approved July 25, 1946.
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same Convention, however, restates, in Article 6, in the strongest pos-
sible terms, the rights of each State as to scheduled services:
"No scheduled international air service may be operated over or
into the territory of a contracting State, except with the special
permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance
with the terms of such permission or authorization."
The Chicago Conference also prepared and opened for signature
two agreements known respectively as the "International Air Services
Transit Agreement" 11 and the "International Air Transport Agree-
ment" 14, to be discussed later. They are legally multilateral permits
under Article 6 of the Chicago Convention, authorizing, in the Transit
Agreement, certain privileges, not rights, of flight over and landing
for refueling in the territory of accepting States and, in the Transport
Agreement, certain added commercial privileges. Any State accepting
either agreement may renounce it on one year's notice. Fundamentally,
therefore, the legal position since the Chicago Conference and World
War II continues as before.
Any State, except during the time that it is committed otherwise by
the Transit or Transport or other special Agreements, is still fully
authorized to take advantage of its own political position and bargain-
ing power, as well as the fortunate geographical position of its home-
land and outlying possessions, and unilaterally determine (for eco-
nomic or security reasons) what foreign aircraft will be permitted to
enter or beexcluded from its airspace, as well as the extent to which
such airspace may be used as part of world air trade routes.
III
The legal position of air transport as thus developed poses serious
economic problems to any world organization. The decision of a State
to admit or exclude foreign aircraft engaged in international commerce,
either in transit elsewhere or for the purpose of discharging and picking
up cargo, directly affects world trade and the internal economy of the
State taking such action and that of other States.
Air transport has become an inseparable part of the complicated
fabric of world transport. It is fast taking its place today beside ocean
shipping as one of the great economic factors in the development of
international commerce. Both serve the public-both are instruments
of national transport and communication policy-both enter foreign
territory to compete with local services for international trade. But
the right of a State to control the use of these two world economic
forces has in certain respects developed very differently.1" Any State
13. International Civil Aviation Conference, op. cit. supra note 12, at 87.
14. Id. at 91.
15. LissrzYN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 403-405.
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may refuse to allow the entry of aircraft of a second State, but it would
be guilty of an almost unfriendly act if it refused the entry of merchant
vessels of that State. In other respects the international rights and
privileges of air transport and ocean shipping, as they affect world
economy, are very similar-much more so than is indicated by popular
discussion of "freedom of the air" and "freedom of the seas." A brief
statement of some of the historic background of the development of
world transport may be useful.
The name of Hugo Grotius, the great Dutch lawyer and scholar,
will always be linked with the rights now enjoyed by ocean shipping
on the high seas. His arguments must today be reconsidered as appli-
cable to world transport. It will be recalled that in the early years of
the 17th Century claim was made in the name of the Portuguese
(although really on behalf of Spain) that the Portuguese had exclusive
control of parts of the high seas and the Indian Ocean on the trade
route between Europe and the East Indies, that the Portuguese had
sole right to navigate these seas and to trade with the Indies, that the
Dutch must withdraw from this trade. On behalf of his countrynen,
Grotius prepared his celebrated dissertation: "The Freedom of the
Seas or the Right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East
Indian Trade." 16 He denied the right of the Portuguese, or anyone
else, to claim sovereignty of the high seas or exclusive right to their
navigation, and asserted the right of the Dutch to proceed to and
trade with the Indies. He based his argument, as he states, on "the
following most specific and unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Na-
tions, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of which is
self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation is free to travel to
every other nation, and to trade with it." 17
To sustain his first proposition, the right to travel, Grotius insisted in
unanswerable terms on the inequity if not impossibility of national
sovereignty over any part of the high seas and the consequent freedom
of navigation open to all. In support of his second proposition, the
r~ght to trade, he claimed: first, that the Portuguese had no sovereignty
over the Indies and that, as third parties, they had no right to inter-
fere with the desire of the Dutch and the people of the Indies to trade
with each other; and, second, that under the Law of Nations, no State
or ruler "can debar foreigners from having access to their subjects
and trading with them." 11 In concluding Chapter I of his dissertation,
he summarizes his position as follows:
"It follows, therefore, that the Portuguese, even if they had been
sovereigns in those parts to which the Dutch make voyages, wuld
16. GROTIUS, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (Magoffin's Trans. 1916) Introductory Note.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id. at S.
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nevertheless be doing them an injury if they should forbid them
access to those places and from trading there.
"Is it not then an incalculably greater injury for nations which de-
sire reciprocal commercial relations to be debarred therefrom by the
acts of those who are sovereigns neither of the nations interested,
nor of the element over which their connecting high road runs? Is
not that the very cause which for the most part prompts us to exe-
crate robbers and pirates, namely, that they beset and infest our
trade routes?" 19
To apply his argument more easily to present day conditions, it may
be restated as follows:
(1) No State has sovereignty over the high seas, and its navigation
is free to all.
(2) No State, whose sovereignty is not affected, has the right to
interfere with reciprocal trading arrangements between two other
States.
(3) No State has the right to limit or control the entry into its
territory for trading purposes of the transport of another State,
On his first contention the verdict of history is with Grotius. It is
no longer disputed that the high seas are free to the commerce and
navigation of all nations. No State would now be allowed to claim or
to exercise rights of sovereignty over the high seas. In the language of
Oppenheim: "The term 'Freedom of the Open Sea' indicates the rule
of the Law of Nations that the open sea is not, and never can be, under
the sovereignty of any State whatever." 1 This is the true doctrine of
"Freedom of the Seas."
International air transport enjoys exactly the same "freedom of the
air." As no State has or can exercise sovereignty over the high seas,
similarly it can exercise no sovereignty in the airspace above the high
seas. Every State has equal right to navigate in the airspace over the
high seas without obtaining the consent of any other State. 1 This
common right was formally acknowledged for the first time in Article 12
of the Chicago Convention. Under this provision States bound thereby
agree that "over the high seas, the rules in force shall be those estab-
lished under this Convention." 12 In other words, no single State can
adopt such rules binding on the others, but the parties to the Conven-
tion as among themselves may properly agree to the rules which they
will accept in the airspace over which none of them can claim sov-
ereignty.
19. Id. at 10.
20. 2 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 654.
21. 1 "GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER (1932) 517; LISSITZN,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 403.
22. International Civil Aviation Conference, op. cit. supra note 12, at 62.
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On his second contention, namely, that the Portuguese were not in
fact sovereigns of the East Indies and could not, therefore, interfere
with Dutch trading arrangements with the peoples of those islands,
Grotius was fully sustained in his own time by the facts, and is now
by the law. XWhat he then asked is fully enjoyed today by both shipping
and air transport. Arrangements between States under which they
agree to the conditions and terms governing the entry into their terri-
tories of their respective aircraft are fully recognized under the doc-
trine of national sovereignty of the airspace. No State would be heard
to claim a right to interfere in the trade route between the other States,
unless the airspace sovereignty of this third State became involved.
If only the high seas are between two States, they may agree as they
alone wish as to the trade between them, whether it be by ocean
shipping or air transport.
Grotius' third position, is, however, not so clear, either as a legal or
economic proposition-that the Dutch should be entitled to trade
with the people of the Indies even though the Portuguese held rights
of sovereignty over the islands and objected to the entry of the Dutch
ships. This assumes that there is a recognized right under international
law for ocean shipping to pass through such territorial waters as it
sees fit and to enter and trade in such national ports as may be desired,
irrespective of the will of the State holding sovereignty over the terri-
torial'waters and ports thus entered. It also assumes that world eco-
nomics and world trade will benefit if a State may unilaterally and
against the will of the second State control the amount of trade between
the two States so far as entry of the transport of the first State into the
territory of the second is concerned.
No such technical legal right seems t9 exist. To the extent that a
similar practice now exists as to ocean shipping, it would appear to
result from various conditions quite apart from the doctrine of "free-
dom of the seas." National sovereignty over seaports is still fully rec-
ognized. In theory a State may open or close its ports as it desires.
But the international right to exert this sovereignty by keeping all
the ports of any country closed became, during the 19th Century, a
very open question. Under international custom, developed in the
first half of the 19th Century, merchant ships do enter foreign ports
without special license, provided such ports have been opened to inter-
national commerce. This privilege has been variously ascribed to the
existence of some type of implied license--also to the existence and
indirect effect of various treaties of navigation and commerce, which
reciprocally authorized the commercial entry of merchant ships into
the ports of the States concerned. These treaties (together with the
most-favored nation clauses in other treaties) created a situation which
made it most difficult for any State, without good reason, to regulate
the terms of entry, including freights to be charged, or to bar entirely
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foreign merchant vessels of another State from entering one of its
ports open to the foreign commerce of others.3
This historic process seems to have been initiated largely by a
change in British shipping policy. Mance.24 quotes as follows from a
British Board of Trade Departmental Committee of 1918:
"The commercial treaties which govern our maritime relations
cover a period of more than 250 years, during which our policy has
gradually changed from the mercantilism of the Navigation Laws
to the freedom of more recent times. Most of these treaties are rela-
tiv.ely modern, but some, especially those with the old maritime
Powers such as Sweden, Denmark, Spain and even France, Holland
and the United States, go far back and bear the impress of the
policy underlying them. Since the middle of the last century the
navigation policy of this country has been based on the great as-
cendancy of the British mercantile marine and the widespread
character of our trades, which made protection both unnecessary
and undesirable. Our object was to obtain free access to the ports
and the trade of foreign countries. It was therefore inexpedient to
give British shipping privileged treatment at home since such action
could only have afforded foreign countries an excuse for similarly
differentiaiing in favor of their own vessels. In view of its relative
size the British mercantile marine stood to gain more from free ac-
cess to foreign countries than foreign flags stood to gain from free
access to British ports; and conversely a policy of mutual restriction
would for the same reason have caused more harm to British than
to foreign shipping."
The present legal position as to shipping seems, therefore, to be
about as follows: a State retains sovereignty over its ports and may
in theory close them to others. However, by treaty and custom, there
now exists what amounts to a general license, under which maritime
States accord to shipping a privilege of passage through territorial
waters adjacent to the high seas and of entry into ports to refuel or to
discharge and pick up cargo. So far as shipping is concerned, Grotius
is, under present practice, winning his last point-but not on the basis
of a recognized international law right of access and trade.
But such is not the situation in the air. When the Paris Convention
23. This generalization is that of the author of this article, not based on any single
authority. For consideration of this difficult subject, see: 2 GIDEL, op. Cit. supra note 21,
at 9-58; 2 MOORE, INT. L. DIGEST (1906) 269-272; 5 id. 736-742; 2 HACKWORTtI, op. Cit.
supra note 9, at 206-208. As to very limited indirect extent (except in time of war) of gov-
ernment control of ocean freight rates in foreign trade, see: Sanderson, Warlime Con rol of
Ocean Freight Rates in Foreign Trade, A World Survey, BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DoMIES-
TIc COMMERCE TRADE PRoMOTION SER. 212 (1940); Sanderson, Control of Ocean Freight
Rates in Foreign Trade, A World Survey, BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DoMEsTic CoMMEnRCE
TRADE PROMOTION SER. 185 (1938).
24. MANCE, INTERNATIONAL SEA TRANSPORT (1944) 73.
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was being drafted, aviation security questions, not commercial prob-
lems, were still uppermost in the minds of men. Aircraft flying over
cities and into the interior posed problems quite different from those of
the entry of merchant shipping into coastal ports. Today, with the
emergence of new airborne weapons of mass destruction, these security
questions seem even more important. When the law of the air became
fixed and national sovereignty of the airspace wras accepted, the license
to enter national territory for trading purposes, claimed by Grotius
and historically developed for merchant shipping, was denied to air
transport. Control was retained by the State flom over. It follows
that:
(a) Any maritime State may (with its ocean ship operators) uni-
laterally determine the volume and cost to the public of ocean
shipping under its flag engaged in international trade to and
through the open ports of a second State, irrespective of the
economic effect on the latter or on world trade.
(b) The second State, at the same time, may unilaterally determine
the volume of the air transport of the first State which it may
allow to enter its territory and may fix any conditions or limi-
tations on such entry, irrespective of the economic effect on the
first State or on world trade.
The international conflicts resulting from this situation are clear.
They must be faced by any world organization.
As to the economic advantages of the free right to trade claimed by
Grotius under his view of the Law of Nations, the present writer is not
at all certain that the economically uncontrolled right of entry of
foreign merchant vessels into national ports has always been a source
of ultimate advantage to world economy. It may approach treason to
make such a suggestion, but the world is in a state of transition, and
it might be advantageous to reconsider world transport, both ocean
shipping and air transport, as a single economic unit.
When a merchant vessel, for example of British registry, enters a
foreign port, for example American, and discharges its cargo and then
offers for sale its available load capacity for the carriage of outbound
American cargo, the British vessel is actually offering for sale in the
American port a British product in direct competition with a similar
American product (the load capacity of American vessels) and without
the price protection of a protective or other tariff. The British vessel
was probably constructed in British shipyards under British costs.
It is certainly manned by British seamen paid under British wage
scales. It is operated under British regulations. The freights which it
will charge are based on these conditions and costs. The capacity
which it has to take on cargo in the American port is as much a British
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export as would be an automobile transported from Great Britian and
unloaded for local sale in an American port. Under international prac-
tice, the United States has no direct government control of the rate at
which the British ship offers its available capacity in the American
port, nor has it retained control of when or how often the British ship
or others of British or other foreign registry enter the same port.
This is the unlimited "right to trade" for which Grotius contended.
In practice in our own times and because of national ship-operating
cost differentials, it has contributed toward the necessity for mounting
government ship subsidies.
These and other economic pioblems of world shipping must not be
overlooked in any final determination of the position of air transport
and its national and international control. The sale of aircraft ca-
pacity to the public in a foreign airport does not seem to differ in
economic theory or effect from the sale of ocean shipping capacity.
Both provide competition with local services.
At the same time the present arbitrary right of any State to control
world trade and trade routes insofar as is possible by barring or ad-
mitting foreign aircraft, irrespective of the effect on other States, is
difficult to defend except when local national security and economic
conditions are directly and vitally affected. Unjustified control and
regulation, whether it be by a single State or an international body,
must be kept to a minimum and the needs of the public for adequate
transportation must always be in the forefront of any discussion. At
some point, by some process, and through some international procedure
not yet determined, the right to trade by air must be fostered, but at
the same time controlled, so that world trade and the internal na-
tional economy of the States concerned is not at the mercy of the uni-
lateral action of any one State, whether it be the State dispatching its
aircraft in world trade or the State through or to which they will fly.
These are international questions and must be decided accordingly.
IV
International air transport involves political problems equally as
difficult as the economic questions discussed above. In any State,
civil as well as military aviation is an instrument of national air power
and must be so recognized.
"Air power," as the present writer has stated elsewhere, "is the
ability of a nation to act through the airspace, in other words, to use
controlled flight-such for instance, as the flight of aircraft. It is part
of national power, to be used at home or abroad, in peace or in war.
Though its uses are various, both military and civil, it is basically
indivisible. The armed air forces represent but one use of the nation's
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air power. Civil and commercial aviation are supported by and spring
from the same basic national elements." 21
To the extent that any State consents to control or limitation of its
civil air transport by the act of any other State or any international
body, it foregoes one development of its potential air power. Every
State has legitimate national objectives. Within the bounds of inter-
national comity it is entitled to bend its efforts to attain these ob-
jectives through such activities and instrumentalities as it may choose.
In the exercise of its sovereignty, it has the right to develop its air
transport to the extent needed by such legitimate objectives.
In the United States this has been recognized by federal statute.
In the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the public interest is held to
include "the encouragement and development of an air-transportation
system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the for-
eign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Serv-
ice, and of the national defense." =
These are the objectives to which air transport, as part of the air
power of the United States, has been dedicated. Its government and
people are moved by the conscious and unconscious national desire for
commerce, communications, and defense.
Such national incentives must always be included among the long
range elements of national air power which contribute to its develop-
ment. 2 They are the driving forces which spur the State and its
people to action. National defense is such an incentive in every State.
Air transport, though developed for civil purposes, is a vitally neces-
sary part of the equipment for military operations, as the experience
of World War II demonstrated far beyond further argument. Aircraft
need not be armed or carry bombs to take part in wmr. Witness the
parachute troops, the troop carrier commands, the air transport serv-
ices of both army and navy. The aircraft used in war for such pur-
poses are designed and used in time of peace for foreign and domestic
commerce, as are civil air transport routes both national and interna-
tional. When a State's freedom of action in time of peace in activities
such as these is limited, its air power is directly affected.
Other national incentives in the development of air power are
equally as important as that of military defense. The United States
has recognized the development of its foreign and domestic commerce
and communications as a national need. Other States have tacitly
indicated similar incentives. The British, the Germans, the Dutch,
the French, the Swedes, the Japanese--all of the great trading nations
25. COOPER, Air Power and the Coming Peace Treaties (1946) 24 FoREIG.; AFnAnmS
442.
26. 52 STAT. 973 (1938); 49 U.S.C. § 402 (1941).
27. Cooper, 1 Am APFAs (1946), No. 1, at SO.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of our time, were driven to develop air transport by the need for for-
eign commerce and communications. In parts of Canada, China,
Australia and Russia air transport was the only practical mode of rea-
sonably rapid domestic transport-built up in those cases by the na-
tional desire and demand for internal economic and political unity
and trade. In the great colonial powers-Great Britain, France, the
Netherlands, Italy, Belgium-an additional incentive,, appeared-the
need to tie together through rapid air routes politically disintegrating
empires.
Other incentives (toward objectives perhaps legitimate to the States
concerned, though not in the eyes of the world) give much cause for
concern. German foreign air transport, for example, was pushed far
afield-particularly in South America-with the obvious desire of ex-
tending political and ideological infiltration. In the Pacific, supposedly
civil air routes to Korea, Manchuria and the originally mandated
islands were used by the Japanese to bind together an empire seized
through violence and disregard of international commitments.
But it is not alone in such clearly improper cases that the develop-
ment of international air transport may come into conflict with world
interests. In the race for foreign commerce and national expansion,
subsidy wars may develop; local air service of smaller and weaker na-
tions may be forced to discontinue; national economy of other states
may be seriously affected. Many things may occur that, in the mean-
ing of the United Nations Charter, would create a "'ituation which
might lead to international friction." While this possibility may be
still debated by some, it is wise to recall that it was directly admitted
by the Chicago Conference. The Preamble of the Convention on In-
ternational Civil Aviation states that "the future development of
international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve
friendship and understanding among the nations and the peoples of
the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security." 28
As stated earlier, any State in the exercise of its sovereignty has the
right (as well as the duty to itself) to develop its air power, as repre-
sented in part by its air transport, to the extent needed by its domestic
and foreign commerce and other legitimate objectives. But somewhere
an impartial forum must exist in which the legitimacy of these ob-
jectives can be challenged by other States directly concerned. The
development of national air transport of one State may injuriously
affect another or cause a dangerous dispute. Again there must be a
forum and machinery to remedy such a situation. World organization
may well require sufficient international control so that air transport
does not become an instrument of unfair nationalistic economic compe-
tition or political aggression and thus the source of serious international
28. International Civil Aviation Conference,'op. cit. supra note 12, at 59.
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misunderstanding and dangerous ill-feeling.2 But such regulation and
interference with national action by any international body must, as
stated earlier, be kept at a minimum. The needs of the public for ade-
quate transportation must be always in the forefront of any discussion
or decision. World commerce must never be unduly retarded.
V
Such are the fundamental and difficult problems of international air
transport. The machinery of inter-government world organization
now available to meet these problems may perhaps be readjusted to
become effective. It is ineffective today. The existing machinery in-
cludes: the United Nations Assembly, with the Security Council, the
Economic and Social Council and its proposed Transport and Commu-
nications Commission; the Provisional International Civil Aviation
Organization (PICAO), located in Montreal, with its Assembly and
Council-to be succeeded by the permanent International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO).
In August 1944 the United States issued invitations to member
States of the United Nations and certain neutral States for an inter-
national civil aviation conference, referred to earlier in this article as
the "Chicago Conference." It had before it two main objectives-first,
to provide an organization to set up uniform technical and safety
standards for world wide air navigation, as successor to the Interna-
tional Commission for Air Navigation organized under the Paris Con-
vention of 1919; second, and at least of equal importance, to determine
how and to what extent air transport could be subjected to interna-
tional economic and political control. This conference succeeded in
its first objective. It made progress towards its second objective but
without final success.
The Conference drafted and opened for signature four international
agreements: the Convention on International Civil Aviation;" an
Interim Agreement 1' to continue in effect until the Convention
becomes itself effective; the Transit 32 and the Transport Agreements,3'
previously mentioned in this article.
Under the Convention the permanent International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) includes an Assembly on which each member
State is represented, and a Council elected by the Assembly. Under
the Interim Agreement, a similar temporary organization (PICAO)
is now actively functioning.
29. MIANCE, INTERxA-nONAL AIR TRANSPORT (1944) 103.
30. International.Civil Aviation Conference, op. cit. supra note 12, at 59.
31. Id. at 44.
32. Id. at 87.
33. Id. at 91.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ICAO (and temporarily PICAO) is fully authorized to adopt any
necessary international standards for world wide unification of the
technical and safety procedure so vital to every phase of international
air navigation. No further world organization is needed to meet these
problems.
In the economic and political fields the need for international or-
ganization remains unsatisfied. The Convention has given ICAO very
limited economic powers, and these are largely of an administrative
and advisory character, such as: research; study of operation of inter-
national air transport, including ownership of international services
on trunk routes; investigation of situations appearing to present avoid-
able obstacles to development of air navigation; collection and publica-
tion of information, including cost of international operations and
subsidies from public funds. Under certain circumstances ICAO may
provide and administer airports and facilities required by international
air services. But ICAO has no power to fix or control rates, allocate
routes, or control operating frequencies or capacity. Nor can it require
any State to admit into its territory air transport operations of another
State. The legal unilateral ability of any State to control world air
trade routes, as discussed earlier in this article, and the ability of any
State to affect world economy by excluding or admitting to its terri-
tory the sdheduled air transport of other States, have not been affected
by the Convention.
In approaching the economic regulatory problem at Chicago, three
diverse plans, or theories, were urged. Australia and New Zealand,
fearing the political effect of international competition, wished to
have all main international air transport operations owned by a single
world authority with local lines under national flags. Great Britain
and Canada proposed separate but fundamentally similar plans for
economic control through an international organization having definite
powers to fix and allocate international routes, frequencies, capacity,
and rates. The United States opposed economic or political control by
an international organization and favored wide freedom of operation,
No agreement was reached.34
At the end of the Conference, the Transit and Transport Agreements
were separately brought forward to cover the economic control prob-
lems omitted from the permanent Convention. Had the provisions of
either the Transit or the Transport Agreements been included in the
main Convention, certain States would not have signed it.
These separate Agreements .are based on the so-called "Five Free-
34. For an account of the Chicago Conference and particularly the position taken by
the United States delegation, see Blueprint for World Civil Aviation-The Chicago Inter-
national Civil Aviation Conference of 1944 as viewed by Four Members of the United States
Delegation in Recent Magazine Articles, DEP'T OF STATE CONFERENCE SER. 70 (1945).
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doms of the Air," as originally defined by Canada. As stated by
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Air, William A. 2M. Burden, in
an article appearing shortly after the Chicago Conference:
"These freedoms . .. are really privileges, since every country
reserves the sovereignty of its air space." 11
As stated in the Transport Agreement mentioned above:
"Each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the
following freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international
air services:
"1. The privilege to fly across the territory of a contracting State
without landing.
"2. The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes.
"3. The privilege to put down passengers, mail, and cargo taken on
in the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft pos-
sesses.
"4. The privilege to take on passengers, mail, and cargo destined
for the territory of' the State whose nationality the aircraft
possesses.
"5. The privilege to take on passengers, mail, and cargo destined
for the territory of any other contracting State and the privi-
lege to put down passengers, mail, and cargo coming from any
such territory."
The first two "freedoms" cover privileges of air navigation and the
last three privileges of commercial trade. The Transit Agreement in-
cludes the first two and the Transport Agreement all five.
If the Transit Agreement were universally accepted in more perma-
nent form, it would largely solve the difficulties caused by the legal
right of any State to prevent the establishment of world air trade
routes through its territory. In addition to the privilege of transit, the
Agreement also authorizes any State flown. over to require the inter-
national operator to land and offer reasonable commercial services;
it meets the security problem by allowing each State to designate the
route and airports to be used in its territory; it gives added powers to
ICAO by authorizing any State, which deems that action by another
State is causing injustice or hardship under the Agreement, to request
ICAO to investigate; and authorizes ICAO to suspend the guilty State
if corrective action is ordered and not taken.
The Transit Agreement, however, is not now an adequate part of
world organization. It has been accepted by twenty-eight States,
including the United States and Great Britain, but not yet by certain
other important world route States such as Brazil, Egypt and Portugal.
35. Id. at 21.
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As it can be denounced on one year's notice by any one State, it is not
a basis for permanent routes. Its acceptance by the United States, as
well as that of the Transport Agreement, has been attacked as illegal,
it being contended that they are not valid as Executive Agreements,
and that their subject matter required execution and submission to
the United States Senate for ratification as treaties."° The right of the
United States to sign them as Executive Agreements has been as
vigorously defended."
For quite other reasons the Transport Agreement cannot now be
considered as part of a permanent world organization. Vigorously
sponsored by the United States at the Chicago Conference, it covers
the so-called five "freedoms" listed above, including both navigation
and commercial privileges. It contains no provision for rate control,
or limitation of capacity and frequencies, but does include other limi-
tations. These are: the route and airports to be used in national terri-
tory may be designated by the State flown over, as in the Transit
Agreement; in the operation of through services "due consideration
shall be given to the interests of the other contracting States so as not
to interfere unduly with their regional services or to hamper the de-
velopment of their through services"; any State may refuse to accord
the so-called Fifth Freedom privilege, that is to say, refuse the right
of other States to take on and discharge traffic destined to or coming
from the territory of a third contracting State ;-the Fifth Freedom,
traffic itself, is limited to traffic between contracting States; the Third,
Fourth, and Fifth Freedom privileges (the commercial privileges) are
applicable only to "through services on a route constituting a reason-
ably direct line out from and back to the homeland of the State whose
nationality the aircraft possesses"; and the agreement may be re-
nounced on one year's notice.
The Transport Agreement is obviously provisional in character. It
is less liberal in certain respects than present international ocean
shipping practice. But many of the objections to its acceptance, so
the present writer understands, have been based not on this, but
because, on the contrary, it is said to go too far in relinquishing eco-
nomic control by the State flown over. The Agreement has been ac-
36. Wiprud, Some Aspects of Public International Air Law (1945) 13 GEo. WAsH. L.
REV. 264-275; International Commercial Aviation, Resolution of the Committee on Com-
merce, SEN. Doc. No. 173, 79th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1946), (Transport and Bermuda Agree-
ments); N. Y. State Bar Ass'n, Agreements on International Aviation, LAWYER SERVICE
LETTER No. 100 (1946) 408
37. Concerning Acceptance of Aviation Agreements as Executive Agreements-Exchange
of Letters between Senator Bilbo and Acting Secretary Grew, 12 DEP'T Ol STATE BULL. (1945)
1101; also, Article by Stephen Latchford, at 1104; Letter of June 18, 1946 to Secretary of
State from Attorney-General Clark quoted p. 6 of U. S. Sen., 79th Cong., 2d Sess., ExECu-
TiVE REPORT No. 8 (1946) Convention on International Civil Aviation.
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cepted by comparatively few States of great importance to world air
transport. Those accepting include the United States, Sweden, and
the Netherlands, but not Great Britain. For reasons discussed below,
the Agreement has now been renounced by the United States.
At the end of the Chicago Conference, the various proposals for
future economic control were referred to PICAO for study. In May,
1946, when the first Assembly met in Montreal, its agenda included
the draft of a new permanent multilateral convention prepared by the
PICAO Council to meet the economic problems unsolved at Chicago,
and differing in many respects from the Transport Agreement. When
this proposed new convention was presented for consideration at
Montreal, the United States delegation, through its chairman, Mr.
Burden, urged that it be not then acted upon, that no multilateral
convention be then adopted, and that the whole problem of economic
control be fully discusse&and referred back for future study and action
at a later Assembly. The United States did not, however, insist that
the Transport Agreement be accepted as a permanent solution-quite
the contrary. In presenting the United States proposal, which was
adopted, Mr. Burden stated:
"A year and a half ago the United States assumed the responsi-
bility of initiating a multilateral agreement, known as the Air
Transport Agreement. The passage of time and further study of
the problem by many nations led them to reject it for a variety of
reasons. In fact it has been accepted by such a small number of
countries that it can no longer be considered as the basis of a world-
wide scheme for international civil aviation." 3
Prior to the Montreal meeting, certain bilateral agreements had
come into force on the North Atlantic quite inconsistent with the
basic theory of the Transport Agreement. These may point the way
toward a possible compromise pattern for future general international
control. The most important is that between the United States and
Great Britain, concluded at Bermuda on February 11, 1946.11 In this
"Bermuda Agreement," the United States for the first time conceded
a certain measure of control of economic questions, including interna-
tional rate regulation by the governments concerned (with a reference
to PICAO or its successor for an advisory opinion in case of dispute),
and Great Britain waived its prior insistence on direct international
38. Statement on behalf of the United States by William A. M. Burden, Chairman of
the United States Delegation, on the REPORT OF E E Air Tn sronr Comui1r=E oF TE
INTERIm ASSEMBLY on the matters on which it v-as not possible to reach agreement among
the Nations represented at the Chicago Conference. Provisional International Civil Avia-
tion Organization Doe. 1733, EC/21 (1946).
39. Final Act of the Civil Aviation Conference held at Bermuda, January 15 to Febru-
ary 11, 1946, U. S. T EATY SEP. 1507 (1946); also (1946) 14 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 584.
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control of traffic and frequencies and capacities. Certain important
principles were included in the Agreement by which each government
is to be bound in providing service. The routes to be used were defi-
nitely agreed on. The Bermuda Agreement does not constitute a
general "right to trade" by air as between the two countries. Similar
agreements have since been concluded between the United States and
France, and between the United States and Belgium. In view of the
new diplomatic approach to international air transport evidenced by
these agreements, few were surprised when the State Department on
July 25, 1946 announced that the United States was giving notice of its
withdrawal from the Transport Agreement. While the withdrawal
cannot take effect for one year, it ends any possibility that the Trans-
port Agreement will be the basis for worldwide economic understanding.
In the Bermuda Agreement reference is made (in connection with
inter-government control of rates) to the rate-making conference pro-
cedure of the International Air Transport Association (IATA). This
Association, organized after the Chicago Conference, now includes in
its membership practically all of the important international air trans-
port operators in the world.40 Through regional rate traffic confer-
ences, somewhat similar to steamship rate conferences, IATA is seek-
ing to stabilize traffic conditions and prevent rate wars. Under the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 the Civil Aeronautics Board is author-
ized to approve rate and other intercarrier agreements when United
States air carriers are involved. When approved, such agreements are
free from the onus of the anti-trust acts. The Civil Aeronatutics Board
has approved for one year the rate conference machinery set up by
IATA, 41 but has disapproved its first proposed North Atlantic rates. 4
New conference agreements have been submitted to the Board for
approval. The existence and utility of the IATA rate conference
machinery, thus recognized in the Bermuda Agreement, may prove
to be a useful indirect asset in future world economic control.
Remaining for consideration is the status of international air trans-
port under the Charter of the United Nations. In this respect it must
be recalled that the preamble of the Chicago Convention admits that
through abuse international civil aviation "can become a threat to the
general security."
Among the purposes of the United Nations are:" (Article 1)"...
to take effective collective measures .. . for the suppression of acts
40. Hildred, International Air Transport? (June 1946) WonlD RvivIEW 46; Cooper,
1A TA-League of Airlines, (1946) 4 AIR TRANSPORT No. 1, at 29.
41. Civil Aeronautics Board Order Serial 4525, decided Feb. 19, 1946; Agreement CAB
No. 493, IA TA Traffic Conference Resolution.
42. Civil Aeronautics Board Order Serial 4748, decided May 8, 1946; Agreement CAB
586, Resolutions of North Atlantic Tra.fic Conference.
43. Charter of the United Nations, DEP'T OF STATE CONFERENCE SER. 74 (1945).
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of aggression .. .and to bring about by peaceful means . ..settle-
ment of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace;" also "to achieve international cooperation in
solving international problems of an economic .. .character."
It follows that the United Nations must consider the status of inter-
national air transport whenever it presents a case of aggression threat-
ening general security, or a problem in international economic co-
operation.
The General Assembly (Article 13) is directed to initiate studies
and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international
cooperation in the political field, and also international cooperation in
the economic field. The Security Council (Article 34) may investigate
any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction;
(Article 39) determine the existence of any threat to peace or act of
aggression; and (Article 41) may decide what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to decisions,
including "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and
of . . . air . . . and other means of communications."
The Economic and Social Council (Article 60) is responsible under
the authority of the General Assembly for economic problems; (Ar-
ticle 62) may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to inter-
national economic matters and make recommendations on such matters
to the General Assembly; (Article 63) may enter into agreements with
specialized agencies established by inter-government agreement and
having wide international responsibility in the economic field; (Ar-
ticle 64) may take appropriate steps to obtain reports from such spe-
cialized agencies and communicate its observations on these reports to
the General Assembly; (Article 65) may furnish information to the
Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.
The Economic and Social Council in recognition of its responsibilities
(Article 68) set up a "Temporary Transport and Communications
Commission." On May 25, 1946 this temporary Commission filed its
first report with the Economic and Social Council. 44 This report states
that the Commission has made a preliminary general survey of the
inter-governmental organizations in the field of transport and com-
munications; has noted among other things the existence of certain
organizations, including "the recently created Provisional Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (to be superseded by the definitive
International Civil Aviation Organization) ;" has also noted that inter-
governmental agreement and organization in the transport fields dealt
with were concerned principally with cooperation in administration
and technical matters concerning effectiveness or safety of service,
but that inter-governmental agreement on commercial questions such
44. UNCIO, Economic and Social Council, Doc. E/42, (May 25, 1946).
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as rates, routes, subsidies, etc., is a much more difficult question; that
"these matters are regulated to some degree by unofficial international
organizations of operators, such, for example, as IATA in the field of
aviation." The Commission indicated that inter-governmental agencies
in the field of transport and communications dealing with security
matters had existed only in wartime and that "The question now arises
of permanent arrangements to implement decisions which may be
taken by the Security Council to impose sanctions."
In its recommendations, the Commission' includes the suggestion
that PICAO be brought into relation with the Economic and Social
Council as one of the specialized agencies contemplated by Article 57
of the Charter; also that the Commission be authorized to enter into
contact with certain unofficial bodies, for the purpose of exchanging
documents, observers, etc., including IATA. At the Montreal meeting
of the PICAO Assembly in May, 1946, its Council was authorized to
enter into a working agreement with the United Nations. It is there-
fore assumed that some arrangement will be worked out between the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and PICAO for
future cooperation-the nature and extent of which have not yet been
determined.45
It is hoped that this complicated machinery can be made effective
so that many vital questions may be answered. If PICAO, or its
successor ICAO, fails to adopt and have ratified a multilateral conven-
tion providing permanent and acceptable world economic control of
international air transport, is the United Nations, through the Eco-
nomic and Social Council or otherwise, authorized to do so, and if so,
in what manner? If the United Nations should determine that inter-
national air transport is being used as a means of dangerous aggression
which may threaten world security, or if it determines that world eco-
nomic conditions otherwise require remedial action from some situa-
tion growing out of the use of international air transport by one' or
more States, what specific machinery will be put into effect to meet
the situation? If rate wars and subsidies threaten international dis-
cord, who will stop them, and how? If the Security Council determines
on the necessity of sanctions to be applied by stopping civil air com-
munication with one or more States, how is this very difficult situation
to be handled?
Admittedly serious difficulties are ahead in answering these and
many other questions. Russia is a powerful member of the United Na-
45. United Nations Economic and Social Council has now adopted Resolution of
June 21, 1946 (UNCIO, Docs. E/58/Rev. 1 and E/84, par. 2, both [is amended by the
Council) to make permanent the Transport and Communications Commission and au-
thorized negotiations with PICAO "for the purpose of bringing it into relationship with
the United Nations." JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CouNcIL, (July 13, 1946)
515.
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tions, but declined an invitation to attend the Chicago Conference
and is not a member of PICAO, nor has Russia even been represented
by observers. Certain neutral nations (including Spain, Portugal,
Ireland, Switzerland and Sweden) are members of PICAO but are not
members of the United Nations. No provision has been made for
control of air transport in the Axis States or the extent to which they
will be allowed to exercise airspace sovereignty in the future.
World air transport must be dealt with as a single problem through
one cohesive international agency. The respective powers and func-
tions of the United Nations, of its Security Council, of its Economic
and Social Council, and also of PICAO and its successor ICAO, must
be coordinated if world wide economic and security problems are to be
met. Aviation is a dynamic force. World air transport is its most
important instrumentality in time of peace. Such a dynamic force
cannot long await the final decision of political discussions.
